The German Model is a large, effective and highly efficient network with a worldwide reach.  It is given resilience, timeless consistency, and sustainability by interwoven German cultural traits.  The model is supported ever more broadly, and thoroughly, by a growing number of well-staffed and funded organizations, and is tactically utilized daily by tens of thousands of German corporations and family owned firms operating in nearly all of the world’s countries.

 

This network is well tested, continuously sharpened by use and the rigors of competition, and highly adaptable to a wide variety of cultural conditions.  The model is mature, respected, and generally accepted as successful.  As a network it has formal and informal, deep and broad channels of contacts and suppliers in host nations.  These channels could be considerably expanded by request, expanding mission, or by the necessity of changing circumstances.

 

This model in its broadest sense is the backbone of one of the world’s most powerful economies and is the most complete and effective model to provide an alternative to the Anglo-American model, at least for the near future.  It is not surprising that China, with 1,400,000,000 hard-working people could recently surpass Germany and Japan for the number two spot in world economies.  What is amazing is that Germany, with 82,000,000 barely working people, is the equal of China’s best efforts.  Today Germany is a strong society in spite of itself: In my estimation, twenty to twenty-five percent of its productivity, in both human capital and infrastructure, sits idle or is greatly under-utilized. 

 

The model described within this paper is so central to the security and health of German society that a primary role of the Chancellor is to manage the model: Effectively facilitating the slow but necessary changes, keeping the broad model up-to-date and intact.  This is done mostly by stealth, behind the scenes, through discreet and informal consensus building: Bringing change agents to the round table.  The model and the methods of change are resolutely German.

 

The size, reach, and effectiveness of the elements of the model—strengthened by the consistency of tangible and unique cultural traits, and supported by the quietly growing missions of state-oriented institutions—is consistently downplayed.  Germany prefers to maintain a public image of a normal cooperative state which, by constitution and inbred pacifism, desires little influence outside the general control of its own population.  Since the end of WWII this has been an historically prudent policy.  In the past decade or so this policy has morphed into a perpetual excuse to both cling to leisure activities, and avoid the risk of criticism that comes with greater responsibility.

 

The conclusion of my research to date is that Germany has in place all that is necessary to assume a broader world-wide role. All systems are go for a variety of missions within that role.  However, the methods once necessary for survival have become mechanisms now used to control the political environment, and ingrained habits that allow Germany to remain surprisingly dependent on others and unwilling to demonstrate its existing strength: Thus, robbing the world’s people of what Germany uniquely has to offer. 

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